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Typicai module lifetimes were less than 1 year but
are now estimated to be greater than 10 years.
(Ten-year warranties are now available.)
Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) tunded the now
operational siiicon refinement production plan! with
1200 MT/year capacity. DOE/FSA-sponsored efforts
were prominent in the uce process research
and development.
A Block I moduie (fabricated in 1975). heid in front of tour
Block V modules. represents the progress of an 11-year effort.
The modules, designed and manufactured by industry to FSA
specifications and evaluated by FSA, rapidly evolved during
the series of module purchases by DOE/FSA
The automated machine interconnects solar celis
and places them for module assembly. The second-
generation machine made by .Kulicke and Satta was
cost shared by Westinghouse Corporation and OOE/FSA
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The Flat-Plate Solar Array (FSA) Project, funded by the U.S. Government and managed by the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, was formed in 1975 to develop the module/array technology needed to attain widespread terrestrial
use of photovoltaics by 1985. To accomplish this, the FSA Project established and managed an Industry, Univer-
sity, and Federal Government Team to perform the needed research and development (R&D).
PA&1 performed planning and integration activities to support management of the various FSA Project R&D
activities. Technical and economic goals were established by PA&I for each R&D task within the Project to coor-
dinate the thrust toward the National Photovoltaics Program goals.
A sophisticated computer modeling capability was developed to assess technical progress toward meeting the
economic goals. These models included a manufacturing facility simulation [Solar Array Manufacturing Industry
Costing Standards (SAMICS)], a photovoltaic power station simulation [Lifetime Cost and Performance (LCP)] and a
decision aid model incorporating uncertainty [SIMulation of Research ANd Development Projects (SIMRAND)]. This
family of analysis tools was used to track the progress of the technology and to explore the effects of alternative
technical paths. Numerous studies conducted by PA&I signaled the achievement of milestones or were the foundation
of major FSA Project and National Program decisions.
This document summarizes the most important PA&I activities during the Project's history. It discusses the PA&I
planning function and how it related to Project direction and reviews important analytical models developed by PA&I
for its analytical and assessment activities. The document summarizes major studies completed during the term of the
Project and provides considerable insight into the role played by PA&I in supporting Project management.
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Foreword
Throughout U.S. history, the Nation's main source of energy has changed from wood to coal to petroleum. It is
inevitable that changes will continue as fossil fuels are depleted. Within a lifetime, it is expected that most U.S. energy
will come from a variety of sources, including renewable energy sources, instead of from a single type of fuel. More
than 30 % of the energy consumed in the United States is used for the generation of electricity. The consumption of
electricity is increasing at a faster rate than the use of other energy forms and this trend is expected to continue.
Photovoltaics, a promising way to generate electricity, is expected to provide significant amounts of power in years to
come. It uses solar cells to generate electricity directly from sunlight, cleanly and reliably, without moving parts.
Photovoltaic (PV) power systems are simple, flexible, modular, and adaptable to many different applications in an
almost infinite number of sizes and in diverse environments. Although photovoltaics is a proven technology that is
cost-effective for hundreds of small applications, it is not yet cost-effective for large-scale utility use in the United
States. For widespread economical use, the cost of generating power with photovoltaics must continue to be
decreased by reducing the initial PV system cost, by increasing efficiency (reduction of land requirements), and by
increasing the operational lifetime of the PV systems.
In the early 1970s, the pressures of the increasing demand for electrical power, combined with the uncertainty of
fuel sources and ever-increasing prices for petroleum, led the U.S. Government to initiate a terrestrial PV research and
development (R&D) project. The objective was to reduce the cost of manufacturing solar cells and modules. This
effort, assigned to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, evolved from more than a decade-and-a-half of spacecraft PV power-
system experience and from recommendations of a conference on Solar Photovoltaic Energy held in 1973 at Cherry
Hill, New Jersey.
This Project, originally called the Low-Cost Solar Array Project, but later known as the Flat-Plate Solar Array (FSA)
Project, was based upon crystalline-silicon technology as developed for the space program. During the 1960s and
1970s, it had been demonstrated that photovoltaics was a dependable electrical power source for spacecraft. In this
time interval, solar-cell quality and performance improved while the costs decreased. However, in 1975 the costs were
still much too high for widespread use on Earth. It was necessary to reduce the manufacturing costs of solar cells by a
factor of approximately 100 if they were to be a practical, widely used terrestrial power source.
The FSA Project was initiated to meet specific cost, efficiency, production capacity, and lifetime goals by R&D in all
phases of flat-plate module (non-concentrating) technology, from solar-cell silicon material purification through verifica-
tion of module reliability and performance.
The FSA Project was phased out at the end of September 1986.
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FSA Project Summary
The Flat-Plate Solar Array (FSA) Project, a Government-sponsored photovoltaic (PV) project, was initiated in
January 1975 with the intent to stimulate the development of PV systems for economically competitive, large-
scale terrestrial use. The Project's goal was to develop, by 1985, the technology needed to produce PV modules
with 10% energy conversion efficiency, a 20-year lifetime, and a selling price of $0.50/Wp (in 1975 dollars). The
key achievement needed was cost reduction in the manufacture of solar cells and modules.
As manager, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory organized the Project to meet the stated goals through research and
development (R&D) in all phases of flat-plate module technology, ranging from silicon-material refinement through
verification of module reliability and performance. The Project sponsored parallel technology efforts with periodic pro-
gress reviews. Module manufacturing cost analyses were developed that permitted cost-goal allocations to be made
for each technology. Economic analyses, performed periodically, permitted assessment of each technical option's
potential for meeting the Project goal and of the Project's prog ress toward the National goal. Only the most promising
options were continued. Most funds were used to sponsor R&D in private organizations and universities, and led to
an effective Federal Government-University-Industry Team that cooperated to achieve rapid advancement in PV
technology.
Excellent technical progress led to a growing participation by the private sector. By 1981, effective energy conser-
vation, a leveling of energy prices, and decreased Govemment emphasis had altered the economic perspective for
photovoltaics. The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) National Photovoltaics Program was redirected to longer-
range research efforts that the private sector avoided because of higher risk and longer payoff time. Thus, FSA con-
centrated its efforts on overcoming specific critical technological barriers to high efficiency, long life, reliability, and
low-cost manufacturing.
To be competitive for use in utility central-station generation plants in the 1990s, it is estimated that the price of
PV-generated power will need to be $0.17/kWh (1985 dollars). This price is the basis for a DOE Five-Year Photo-
voltaics Research Plan involving both increased cell efficiency and module lifetime. Area-related costs for PV utility
plants are significant enough that flat-piate module efficiencies must be raised to between 13 and 17%, and module
life extended to 30 years. Crystalline silicon, research solar cells (non-concentrating) have been fabricated with more
than 20% efficiency. A full-size experimental 15% efficient module also has been fabricated. It is calculated that a
multimegawatt PV power plant using large-volume production modules that incorporate the latest crystalline silicon
technology could produce power for about $O.27/kWh (1985 dollars). It is believed that $O.17/kWh (1985 dollars) is
achievable, but only with a renewed and dedicated effort.
Government-sponsored efforts, plus private investments, have resulted in a small, but growing terrestrial PV in-
dustry with economically competitive products for stand-alone PV power systems. A few megawatt-sized, utility-
connected, PV installations, made possible by Government sponsorship and tax incentives, have demonstrated the
technical feasibility and excellent reliability of large, multimegawatt PV power-generation plants using crystalline sili-
con solar cells.
Major FSA Project Accomplishments
.. Established basic technologies for all aspects of the manufacture of nonconcentrating, crystalline-silicon PV
modules and arrays for terrestrial use. Module durability also has been evaluated. These resulted in:
.. Reducing PV module prices by a factor of 15 from $75/Wp (1985 dollars) to $5/Wp (1985 dollars).
• Increasing module efficiencies from 5 to 6% in 1975 to more than 15% in 1985.
.. Stimulating industry to establish 1O-year warranties on production modules. There were no warranties in 1975.
.. Establishing a new, low-cost high-purity silicon feedstock-material refinement process.
.. Establishing knowledge and capabilities for PV module/array engineering/design and evaluation.
.. Establishing long-life PV module encapsulation systems.
.. Devising manufactu ring and life-cycle cost economic analyses.
• Transferred technologies to the private sector by interactive activities in research, development, and field
demonstrations. These included 256 R&D contracts, comprehensive module development and evaluation efforts,
26 Project Integration Meetings, 10 research forums, presentations at hundreds of technical meetings, and ad-
visory efforts to industry on specific technical problems .
.. Stimulated the establishment of a viable commercial PV industry in the United States.
vi
Project Analysis and Integration Summary
The Project Analysis and Integration (PA&I) Area was formed as part of the original Flat-Plate Solar Array (FSA)
Project. Its function was to provide analyses needed to guide the Project's technical development toward achieve-
ment of the National Photovoltaics Program's goals, and to serve as a communication link between the various areas
of the FSA Project and other elements of the National Photovoltaics Program. PA&I fulfilled these objectives by sup-
porting Project management with information needed for planning and decision-making, by developing analytical
models used to assess technical progress, by preparing key studies used to set the direction for Project activities, and
by operating an information exchange program that interacted in varying degrees with every other element of the FSA
Project and the National Program.
PA&I played a significant role in planning throughout the Project's history, reflecting the emphasis placed on
economic performance in measuring progress. During the last half of the 1970s, PA&I helped reformulate original Pro-
gram goals to reflect what had been learned about photovoltaic (PV) technology and to expand it to include concen-
trator PV technology, tests and demonstration plans, and a broadening of scope to cover commercialization and industri-
alization goals. In 1979, PA&I developed a detailed Project plan describing the path to technical readiness in 1982. This
plan guided Project activity during its most active years. More recently, PA&I was involved in planning for the remaining
years of the Project when the National Program emphasized potentially large payoff, high-risk technology developed for
long-term industry use.
PA&I developed several important models used to support the planning and decision-making activities of Project
management. The most important model, Solar Array Manufacturing Industry Costing Standards (SAMICS), is a detailed
manufacturing-cost model, supported by a complete overhead cost structure and an extensive cost-account catalog.
SAMICS has been used to prepare consistent and reliable module-production cost estimates for technical options during
most of the Project's history. Another important model developed by PA&I, SIMulation of Research ANd Development
(SIMRAND), is a Monte Carlo simulation model with the capacity to analyze complex research and development (R&D)
decisions involving uncertain information. The SIMRAND model was used successfully to compare the various technical
options supported by the National Program. The final major model developed was Lifetime Cost and Performance (LCP),
which is a simulation model for estimating the output, costs, and revenues of a PV system over its lifetime. LCP can
model the performance of a PV system in a specific application involving the exact conditions of diverse geographical
locations. LCP has been used to explore many application issues including operation and maintenance schedules and
tracking configurations.
PA&I prepared several significant studies during the Project's tenure to assess the status of the technology, to deter-
mine the potential economic status of various options, and to illustrate reasonable courses of action for reaching the
Project goals. The first thorough application of the SAMICS methodology was in preparation of the "Economic Analysis
of a Candidate $O.50/Wp Flat-Plate Photovoltaic Manufacturing Technology." The study showed, for the first time, that a
silicon-ribbon technology had the economic capability to meet the Project goals. The first attempt to set guidelines for
the development of individual aspects of the technology was the "Price Allocation Guidelines." By considering such
things as maturity of technology and resources available to deal with the problem, goals were set for specific aspects of
the technology. In 1981, in another significant study, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory joined forces with the Solar Energy
Research Institute to assess the prospects for the various silicon sheet options. Using the SIMRAND model, the uncer-
tainty surrounding the prospects for various technology elements were incorporated in comparisons between
technologies.
As the Project drew toward its close, PA&I made some final assessments of the leading PV technologies under
development. These studies showed that the FSA Project had achieved many of the goals originally set by the
National Photovoltaics Program and had made significant progress toward attainment of the more demanding goals of
the U.S. Department of Energy Five-year Research Plan. More R&D work is necessary, however, for photovoltaics to
be competitive in today's energy markets. PA&I hands down the economic and decision-making tools necessary to
support future efforts to complete the technology development task. It also provides documentation of the Project's
history in economic terms.
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SECTION I
Introduction
A. PURPOSE
The Conference on Photovoltaic Conversion of
Solar Energy for Terrestrial Applications, held at Cherry
Hill, New Jersey, in October 1973, initiated an evaluation
of the use of photovoltaic (PV) conversion devices for
terrestrial applications. Subsequently, a Federal National
Photovoltaic Program was formed in 1975 that defined
an active role for the Government in support of PV
research and development (R&D). The Conference
found that PV development for terrestrial applications
could make a significant contribution to the Nation's
energy needs if certain technical questions could be
resolved and system costs reduced.
The Flat-Plate Solar Array (FSA) Project1 was
organized at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in
1975 to implement a research program to achieve the
flat-plate, crystalline-silicon module goals established
by the National Program. At that time, the FSA Project
assumed responsibility to support the industrial devel-
opment of reliable, low-cost ($0.50/Wp), silicon solar
modules having at least 10% conversion efficiency
and a useful life of 20 years. Since then, FSA R&D has
encompassed all phases of flat-plate module technology,
from basic feedstock materials of the PV manufacturing
processes, through verification of module reliability and
performance in the field.
Organization of the Project showed it to be unique,
not only for its broad spectrum of activities as well as
its system integration activities, but also because of
the number of industrial organizations, Government
laboratories, academic institutions, and other entities
with which JPL would have to interact.2 Communica-
tion between JPL and the otDer participating organiza-
tions, therefore, would be an important factor in the
Project's success. FSA was one of the first projects at
JPL, and certainly the largest, for which economic per-
formance was the principal measure of success. Techni-
cal performance was not the ultimate goal, but only a
contributing factor to the attainment of the economic
goals. Thus, new analytical methods would be needed
to translate technical performance into future economic
performance. The Project Analysis and Integration (PA&I)
Task was formed as part of the original Project structure
to address the problem of communication and to provide
the analyses needed to guide the Project's technical
development toward achievement of the National
Photovoltaic Program's goals.
The purpose of this document is to reflect upon the
activities undertaken by the PA&I task to fulfill the objec-
tives set for it both at the time of the formation of the
FSA Project and as the Project evolved. The PA&I con-
tributions to the Project essentially have been supportive,
involving the preparation of analytical studies to aid Proj-
ect management in its planning and decision making,
and the preparation and documentation of detailed plans
to integrate Project tasks and ensure their timely comple-
tion. Activities undertaken by PA&I as the planning and
analysis wing of the Project will be described, along with
a perspective on PA&l's role vis-a-vis other elements of
the National Photovoltaics Program.
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
Section II briefly describes some of the activities
PA&I initiated within FSA to help establish and main-
tain an effective, goal-oriented technical program.
Early Program goals and changes in goals and philos-
ophy are discussed in Section III, along with a descrip-
tion of how the PA&I planning task responded to the
changes. Section IV not only discusses some of the
more important models developed at JPL to evaluate
technologies, but also those project results that might
have been anticipated if alternative R&D paths were
pursued by the Project. Section V discusses some of
the more important PA&I studies and how they affected
decision-making during the tenure of the Project. Section
VI summarizes the status of crystalline-silicon technology
today. Section VII summarizes some "lessons learned"
and the legacy left by significant accomplishments of the
PA&I activity.
1The JPL Project, first called the Low-Cost Silicon Solar Array (LSSA) Project, later became the Low-Cost Solar
Array (LSA) Project, and finally the FSA Project.
2Technology development at the PV-array level has been managed by JPL. Balance-of-system (BOS) and test and
evaluation activities have been managed by the Sandia National Laboratory (SNL), and PV-array research activi-
ties have been managed by the Solar Energy Research Institute (SERI).
SECTION II
Project Perspective
At the outset, the National Photovoltaics Program
intended to promote a private, competitive PV industry.
This meant the industry being able to produce PV sys-
tems at a cost (including a return on equity) no greater
than the price at which they could be sold in a competi-
tive market. The Program developed price goals derived
from this consideration. Early in the Program,JPL's FSA
Project became responsible for.the support of the devel-
opment of flat-plate modules capable of producing elec-
trical power at a cost of $0 .50/WP in 1974 dollars. Tech-
nology goals of the Project were directly adopted from
the original goals established at the Workshop on Photo-
voltaic Conversion of Solar Energy for Terrestrial Appli-
cations held at Cherry Hill, New Jersey, in late 1973
(Reference 1).3
Almost all technology development was to be done
by industry with JPL providing coordination and leader-
ship to permit an effective goal-oriented technical pro-
gram. The ensuing years saw many important develop-
ments in PV technology. New crystal growth methods
were developed to increase crystal ingot growth-size,
and a number of innovative ribbon-erystal growth
methods were nurtured. Methods of sawing the crystal
into thin wafers were investigated, and energy efficient,
low-labor cost processes were developed for processing
silicon wafers into solar cells. Automated assembly of
cells into electrical networks of cells replaced hand
soldering. Entirely new low-eost materials for encap-
sulating the electrical networks were developed to pro-
duce modules of much longer service lifetime in the field.
A systematic test and failure analysis program was
begun to allow industry to avoid many costly failures in
the field and to quickly rectify those that did occur.
Engineering of the entire array as an integrated structure
helped eliminate redundant structural materials.
From the beginning of the Project, a rapid flow of
technical information was generated that required sys-
tematic assessment. A major role of the PA&I Area
was to establish and maintain Project standards and
methodologies for comparison of Project options. Act-
ing as the Project translator between technical and
economic performance, PA&I tracked and assessed
Project progress to derive maximum technical and
economic benefit while keeping cost and risk to a
minimum.
A. PROGRESS ASSESSMENT
In the early years, two major tools were
developed for economic assessment of candidate
technologies:
(1) Price Allocation Guidelines (PAG) is a "top-
down" apportioning of the Project goal to
each major step in the production of modules.
(2) Solar Array Manufacturing Industry Costing
Standards (SAMICS) is a "bottom-up" com-
putation of the required market price of each
candidate technology to assess its potential
for meeting the allocation in the PAG and to
compare it to the potential of other candidate
technologies.
Because a wide range of activities was to be pur-
sued, the module development process was divided
into basic activities, each of which was responsible for
meeting a certain fraction of the total cost reduction
required to meet the Program goal. Technical experts
were queried by PA&I as to the methods by which costs
might be reduced in their fields of expertise. Allocations
among the activities were derived through joint consider-
ation of technical possibilities thought to be available.
Allocations were formalized through a review process
into price allocation guidelines for Project activities.
In this manner, allocations were determined for
silicon material, for the creation of silicon sheet, for
processing sheets into cells, and for encapsulating and
assembling PV modules. As technical innovations were
achieved, these allocations were revised. The price-
allocation process became an integral function of the
PA&I task as the FSA Project's technological history
unfolded. Juxtaposed against this process was the
problem of determination of the economic worth of
innovations and how it contributed to attainment of the
Project goal.
Given the importance of the projected manufacturing
costs of various processes involved in the choice of
which technical path to pursue, it was essential that
technology assessments be made with consistent meth-
odological assumptions and approaches. For comparing
3The goal of $0.50/Wp, established at the Cherry Hill Conference, was in late 1973 or 1974 prices. A subsequent
goal statement for the Project of $0.50/Wp in 1975 dollars did not account for inflation between late 1973 and
1975. In this report, economic results are referenced to the 1974 dollars proposed at Cherry Hill.
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PV module manufacturing processes, PA&1 developed
and applied a methodology that employed standardized
and appropriate costs for labor, materials, utilities, and
services, while using validated cost-estimating relation-
ships. Development of SAMICS methodology began
early in the history of the Project, and was further
expanded and refined as time progressed. SAMICS
became the single most important tool of the FSA Pro-
ject in guiding research priorities and measuring pro-
gress toward achievement of price goals. (SAMICS
and other methodologies developed and applied by
PA&1 are discussed in more detail in Section IV of this
report.)
As time progressed, complex choices were required
among the alternative research paths for technology
development. To complicate matters further, informa-
tion available on elements of each research path often
was relatively uncertain in nature (several outcomes
were possible). In 1981, SIMulation of Research ANd
Development Projects (SIMRAND) was developed
specifically to support decision-making in an uncertain
environment. SIMRAND can estimate the probability
that a specific research path will be the best from a
network of possibilities. Using the opinions of experts,
SIMRAND directly incorporates the uncertain outlook
surrounding elements along each research path. The
use of SIMRAND resulted in an improved degree of
consistency and objectivity in R&D decision-making.
As research needs were revealed, the PA&I task
continued to develop expertise and support for the
development of models required to perform the new
assessment functions. With the beginning of applica-
tion experiments in the field, it became important to
model PV systems in a specific application and geo-
graphic location. In evaluating the real value of a PV
system, all costs and revenues over its operating
lifetime must be included. These considerations led to
the development of the Lifetime Cost and Performance
(LCP) model. LCP is a simulation program capable of
modeling the lifetime performance of a PV array. The
product of an LCP simulation is the electrical energy
output, and the cost and revenue streams from the
system's operation. With LCP in place, studies could
be performed, for example, to determine the value of
improvements to the lifetime power output of a system
and how much additional expense could be incurred
during cell and module fabrication to acquire added
performance.
During the tenure of the FSA Project, the alloca-
tions and models described above were applied either
individually to specific problems, such as narrow tech-
nical decisions, or as an integrated set when high-level,
long-range management decisions were required. The
top-down, price-goal allocations provided each technical
area with its own economic/technical subgoals. The tech-
nical manager of each area had broad discretion how
that subgoal would be met. The manager continuously
could evaluate various options by applying the bottom-up
manufacturing cost simulation (SAMICS), and compare
the result to that of the top-down price-goal allocation.
Manufacturing cost-point estimates generated by
SAMICS were combined via SIMRAND, with the uncer-
tainties associated with those estimates, to form proba-
bility distributions of technical performance and/or cost.
These distributions were used either indiVidually to
assess the probability of meeting a sub-goal, or were
aggregated into probabilities of meeting higher level
goals. In this way, the results of a SAMICS analysis of
various technical options were assessed on the basis
of the probability of meeting the top-down goals of the
Project. Progress made toward development of a cost
competitive technology for terrestrial applications was
evaluated by integrating the results of the SAMICS
calculations with the results of the solar array oper-
ating environment using LCP. Lifetime performance
calculations were made which recognized changing
price levels and solar cell output degradation over
time. Using these models, PA&I was able effectively to
recommend to Project management the technical
paths likely to achieve the long-term goal of a com-
petitive PV energy technology.
B. IMPACT OF INFLATION
Efforts to measure progress in crystalline-silicon
technology during the tenure of the FSA Project have
been made difficult by changes in the level of prices
for goods and services in the U.S. economy. Through
the years, inflation has tended to distort and obscure
actual progress made. The goals, therefore, have been
restated, and technology improvements have been mea-
sured in 1985 U.S. dollars using the Gross National
Product (GNP) Implicit Price Deflator. This statistic is
published quarterly by the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
U.S. Department of Commerce.
Table 1 shows the upward trend in the general level
of prices of goods and services since 1974. The total
Table 1. GNP Implicit Price Deflator
Average Annual
Year Inflation Rate, % Cumulative
1974 9.7 1.000
1975 9.5 1.097
1976 5.2 1.201
1977 5.8 1.264
1978 7.4 1.337
1979 8.7 1.436
1980 9.0 1.561
1981 9.4 1.706
1982 6.0 1.866
1983 4.2 1.978
1984 3.6 2.049
1985 3.7 2.125
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of
Current Business, May 1986.
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impact is summarized in the cumulative GNP Implicit
Price Deflator, which more than doubled since the begin-
ning of the FSA Project. The changing level of prices
makes it difficult to detect the more subtle changes
that have taken place in program goals. The original
price goal envisioned for the technology was $0.50/Wp
in 1974 dollars. Using the Implicit Price Deflator, the
equivalent value for the goal in 1985 dollars is $1 .07/Wp.
C. IMPACT OF SHIFTING PROGRAM GOALS
In May 1983, the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) Photovoltaic Energy Technology Division issued
a National Photovoltaics Program Five-Year Research
Plan, 1984-1988 (Reference 2) that significantly altered
the original goals of the FSA Project. The goal since
the Cherry Hill Conference in late 1973 had been
$0.50/Wp ($1 .07/Wp in 1985 dollars). Thus, a PV
system would have to produce electricity at a cost of
$0.263/kWh in 1985 dollars, using the energy cost
methodology in the DOE Five-Year Research PlanA
With the Five-Year Plan, National Program goals
changed to reflect revisions in the outlook for conven-
tional energy resources and progress made in under-
standing the potential of PV technology. Current Pro-
gram goals call for 15 % module efficiency and a
30-year module service life. Expressed in 1985 dollars,
the price goals correspond to an energy cost of
$0.17/kWh, making them much more demanding than
the original values. It was the task of PA&I to interpret
these revisions in the goal structure and to assess
their effects on the FSA Project's technical goals.
In general, the impact of the revision of goals has
been to shift the Program's research effort toward thin-
film solar cell technologies. Although single-crystal silicon
modules dominated commercial production during
much of the Project's tenure, thin-film technology
seems to offer the potential for lower costs in the long
run.5 Recent gains in solar cell efficiencies, however,
have made single-crystal silicon a strong competitor
for the future technology that ultimately will achieve
market competitiveness.
4This result was derived using a module efficiency of 10% and a 20-year module service life, as originally
specified at Cherry Hill.
5The thin-film technology effort has been successful in adopting many of the cell-processing and encapsulation
technologies developed for single-crystal silicon solar cells.
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As a consequence of its role in defining Project
goals and tracking progress, PA&I intimately was
involved, usually as the lead organization, in the formula-
tion of long-range Project plans and was a major contrib-
utor to most National Photovoltaics Program plans. The
planning procedure typically was an iterative process
between PA&I and other involved parties. Because PA&I
included technically cognizant personnel aware of the
status of the various involved technologies, first drafts of
Project long-range plans were written by PA&I, based on
requirements defined by Project management. The first
draft tentatively would define cost goals for each major
technical activity of the Project. Preliminary technical
goals, schedules, and milestones were derived based on
the cost goal, the status of the technology, and an
assessment of the difficulty of work required to reach the
goal. The various models and simulations described later
in this document were extensively applied in this pro-
cess. The draft plan then was reviewed by Project tech-
nical managers. Modifications in successive drafts were
negotiated between PA&I, the technical managers, and
the Project Office until the final plan was completed.
Resource distributions based on the plan then were
negotiated between the Project Manager and the techni-
cal area managers, with PA&I playing a supporting, but
minor, role.
A. NATIONAL PHOTOVOLTAICS PROGRAM
PLANNING: THE EARLY YEARS
Between 1975 and 1980, PA&I played a major
part in formulation of National Photovoltaics Program
plans. Prior to 1977, this Program was guided by the
Proceedings of the Workshop on Photovoltaic Conver-
sion of Solar Energy for Terrestrial Applications held at
Cherry Hill, New Jersey, and a succession of Energy
Research and Development Administration (ERDA) docu-
ments formalizing the Workshop results (References 1,
and 3 through 7). The Workshop was funded by the
National Science Foundation (NSF) and organized by
JPL. At this workshop, goals for 1985 of $0.50/Wp
(1974 dollars), 10% conversion efficiency, 500 MW/year
production, and 20-year lifetime were established for
single-crystal silicon solar cell technology. Basic sched-
ules were formed for the selection of processes for
development and scale-up, and for large-scale plant
construction. The prospects for CdS/CU2S and other
thin-film materials were discussed, and schedules
were set that were less definitive than for silicon. Solar
thermal and satellite systems also were discussed. It
was the silicon plans and schedules from Cherry
however, that attained amazing longevity by becoming
the foundation of the JPL FSA Project. During the period
1973 to 1977, the Cherry Hili report was the de facto
Photovoltaics Program Plan, and the document that
inspired the organization of the FSA Project.
7
By the summer of 1976, the Photovoltaics Pro-
gram had grown considerably. It had been transferred
from NSF to ERDA and was in need of a program plan
that more accurately reflected what actually was hap-
pening. At the behest of ERDA, a Program Planning
Group (PPG) was formed, consisting of representatives
from JPL, SNL, Massachussetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) Energy Lab, MIT Lincoln Lab, NASA Lewis
Research Center, DOD, and the Aerospace Corp. During
a period of a year, the PPG formulated a detailed plan
that updated the Cherry Hill technology plans, moved the
technology development goals to 1986, expanded them
to explicitly include concentrators, described a detailed
test and demonstration plan, and broadened the scope to
include commercialization and industrialization goals.
PA&I personnel were key participants and lead authors
in the formulation of these plans, especially the Tech-
nology Development and Test and Demonstration Plans.
The PPG Plan never was printed in final form. It was
superseded by the ERDA Solar Division Director's Plan.
The foundation of the Director's Plan (Reference 8)
was "market pull" involving large Government purchases
of PV hardware through Program Research and Develop-
ment Announcements (PRDAs) with early, large-scale
utility experiments. The Director presented his plan to
a congressional committee in August 1977. The plan
was not well received because its thrust virtually ignored
residential applications that had been identified in a Con-
gressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) study
as being especially attractive to photovoltaics. The Plan
then was revised and reissued February 3, 1978, con-
taining expanded residential applications, but retaining
the market-puli program strategy. It was reissued again in
March 1978 with minor changes.
There followed a period of progressively more
organized concern in the PV community that questioned
the viability of market pull as a device to attain Program
goals. This culminated in a detailed examination of mar-
ket pull in the SERI Venture Analysis issued in June 1978
(Reference 9). Its conclusions cast serious doubt on the
fundamental assumptions of the Director's Plan. In addi-
tion, legislation by Congress, the "Solar Photovoltaics
Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act
of 1978," Public Law 95-590, called for a major, well-
financed, 10-year program of PV R&D activities.
In 1977, ERDA was replaced by DOE. In 1978, DOE
initiated the formation of a Photovoltaics Lead Center
and identified the need for a new Multiyear Program
Plan (MYPP). JPL, in its role of as yet unofficial Photo-
voltaics Lead Center, proposed to DOE that JPL should
coordinate and integrate the MYPP. The content of the
MYPP first draft issued in June 1979, and reissued in
September 1980, differed from its predecessors in
placing a heavy emphasis on "technology push"
involving R&D of advanced materials. The draft also
incorporated "fixed price buys" of hardware to supply
the applications experiments. Program goals were
redefined, for the first time since Cherry Hill, to be
system-price goals rather than component price goals.
Specific production quantity goals were deleted, through
recognition of the fact that the National Photovoltaics
Program had no direct control of markets.
B. FSA PROJECT PLANS
In all the Program pla.ns, the most important inter-
mediate milestone for FSA technology development
was the attainment by the end of fiscal year (FY) 1982
of "Technical Readiness for $0.70/Wp (1980 dollars)
Technology." Technical readiness for a $0.70/Wp PV
technology implies that all processes required have
been verified with prototype equipment and that the
processes and equipment are ready for application to
a scaled-up production level, sufficient in size to cap-
ture most economies of scale. In September 1979,
PA&I completed a major detailed plan describing the
path to technical readiness. This culminated in late
1982 with monitored physical demonstrations of the
processes and equipment required to fabricate
$0.70/Wp (1980 dollars) PV modules.
A milestone such as "Technical Readiness" has
meaning only in the context of a well-defined goal.
Methods are required to gauge the relevance of the
technology embodied in prototype processes to the
stated goal, and to tell when the goal has been reached.
Both of these conditions were present in the manage-
ment of the JPL Photovoltaics Project and are discussed
in more detail later in this document.
The "Technical Readiness 1982 Plan" (Refer-
ence 10) called for design and fabrication of experi-
mental equipment for bulk polysilicon production, crys-
tal growth, and cell and module fabrication. Some equip-
ment was to be sub-scale, such as the polysilicon plant,
but most were to be full-scale prototypes of production
equipment. Provisions were made to experimentally
ensure that the product of each process would be com-
patible with all following processes. This was considered
to be especially important because PV manufacturers are
very cautious about interrupting production to install new
processes or equipment if there is any question about
compatibility with adjacent processes in the fabrication
sequence.
In addition to manufacturing-technology develop-
ment, the Technical Readiness Plan called for extensive
module design and testing activities to ensure that the
fabrication technology produced fault-tolerant, long-lived
modules for service in the field. It was deemed important
for photovoltaics to avoid the damage to user and public
perception that results from the kinds of costly, highly
visible failures that had befallen some other renewable
energy technologies because of insufficient quality con-
trol and testing prior to fielding the product.
From 1979 to mid-1981, the Technical Readiness
Plan guided the JPL Photovoltaics Project. This was the
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period of maximum Project activity. More than 100 con-
tracts were in force for all phases of flat-plate PV tech-
nology. The largest of the large-scale purchases of mod-
ules from manufacturers for testing and demonstration
occurred during this time, and fabrication of prototype
equipment for integrated prototype production lines was
well underway.
In 1979, PA&I began to examine the question of
what Project activities would be appropriate in the
FY 83-to-FY 86 timeframe given that the objectives
and goals of the Technical Readiness 1982 Plan were
fulfilled. A rather lengthy planning and review process
followed with the final plan undergoing formal JPL
in-house review in the spring of 1981.
The FY-83-to-FY-86 Plan called for an active JPL
role in the transfer and diffusion to private industry of
the technology developed under the Technical Readi-
ness 1982 Plan. Laboratories and prototype equipment
were to be used for hands-on, industry-user familiariza-
tion; facilities were to be available for problem solving
and troubleshooting to aid manufacturers adopting the
technology developed in the DOE/JPL Project. The Plan
also called for an active program in developing module
standards for performance, reliability, and safety that
would help prevent costly failures in the hands of PV
users. The Project was to help in the establishment of
independent testing laboratories for use by industry to
certify their products.
In mid-1981 , a series of events occurred that obvi-
ated many key features of both the Technical Readiness
Plan and the FY 83-FY 86 Plan. Late in the fiscal year,
budget recisions brought an abrupt halt to several devel-
opment efforts and severely curtailed others. The DOE
FY 82 budget specifically mandated the cancellation of
the integrated prototype production lines known as Mod-
ule Experimental Process Systems Development Units
(MEPSDUs). Thus, it no longer was possible to demon-
strate, end-to-end, the fabrication of PV modules and
thereby ensure the industry that no undesirable effects
occurred among the newly developed processes.
Fragmentation of the cell and module process and
equipment development into small, widely scattered
work packages resulted in heavier reliance on the
analytical modeling performed in PA&I to assess the
status of the technology. Because the modeling then
had to be done using incomplete data, integration of
the production line had to be done "on paper." In
retrospect, the resulting analyses have held up well. At
the time, however, the analyses seemed to lack credi-
bility in the industry because there was little tangible
evidence that the assumptions of the analyses could
be realized in an actual integrated production line.
C. THE FIVE-YEAR RESEARCH PLAN: A NEW
DIRECTION
In May 1983, the DOE Photovoltaics Energy Tech-
nology Division issued the National fhotovoltaics Pro-
gram Five-Year Research Plan, 1984-1988. It has guided
the Project since then. Although PA&I had no role in
development of that plan, subsequent analyses by PA&I
led to modifications of certain key assumptions on which
the goals in the Five-Year Plan are based. This left the
Five-Year Plan goals unchanged, but provided more
flexibility in how the goals could be attained.
The Five-Year Plan significantly altered the goals
of the JPL Project for module price and efficiencies.
The goal since the Cherry Hill Conference had been
$O.50/Wp (1974 dollars), equivalent to $1 .07/Wp in
1985 dollars. When this price is used in the Five-Year
Plan energy-cost methodology, the result is $O.263/kWh.
The Five-Year Plan, however, called for an energy cost
of $O.17/kWh in 1985 dollars. To meet this goal, much
more stringent requirements had to be placed on module
costs and efficiencies. Based on PA&I studies, two prin-
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cipal avenues existed for meeting these goals. One was
research to improve sunlight-to-electricity conversion
efficiency, and the other was to reduce the cost of the
silicon wafer. Barring a dramatic breakthrough in ingot
growth and sawing, silicon ribbon became the only
crystalline-silicon technology capable of achieving the
new DOE goals.
The Project was re-oriented in these directions with
an emphasis on basic cell characteristic improvements,
high-efficiency module design, and enhancement of the
dendriticweb ribbon growth effort. A Project Implemen-
tation Plan (Reference 11) was drafted as an internal
guide to implement the provisions of the Five-Year Plan.
In February 1985, however, JPL was directed to termi-
nate the Project at the end of FY 86.
SECTION IV
Analytical Model Development
One of the primary responsibilities of the PA&I
team during the life of the FSA Project has been the
development of models to support the decision-making
and planning activities of Project management. From
the beginning of the Project, a rapid flow of technical
information was generated dealing with the status of
alternative solar cell technologies. There was an immed-
iate need for ways to convert this technical information
into terms that would allow comparisons between tech-
nologies and assessments of progress being made
toward the goals of the National Program.
Three of the most important models that were
developed by PA&I for technology assessment work
were:
(1) Solar Array Manufacturing Industry Costing
Standards (SAMICS).
(2) SIMulation of Research ANd Development
Projects (SIMRAND).
(3) Lifetime Cost and Performance Model (LCP).
Briefly, SAMICS is a methodology for the preparation
of production cost estimates for PV modules. SIMRAND
is a Monte Carlo simulation program that can analyze
complex R&D decisions involving uncertain information.
LCP is a simulation model for estimating the output,
costs, and revenues of a PV system over its lifetime.
These models have been implemented on the IBM-XT
and are being made available to the public through
NASA's Computer Software and Management Infor-
mation Center (COSMIC) located in Athens, Georgia.
Models also have been developed by PA&I for use in
the design of solar cells and solar cell arrays.
All of these models, described in this section,
have been successfully applied by PA&I in its support-
ing role to Project management. Examples of specific
studies for which the models were used are presented
in the next section. (See Section IX, Selected Bibli-
ography, for documents describing these models.)
A. SAMICS
SAMICS was developed as a part of a fair, consis-
tent, and reliable way to compare the various manufac-
turing processes developed by FSA Project subcon-
tractors. The approach was that of an engineering-cost
model that builds a company around detailed manufac-
turing process descriptions. Rule-of-thumb methods,
using customary production-eoefficients, were deter-
mined to be inappropriate because of the new nature
6See Appendix A, Aster, R.W., et al.
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of the processes involved. Because of the relatively
unique nature of PV technology, reasonable cost
estimates could not be expected from methods based
on comparisons with existing manufacturing processes
used in the production of other products.
Considerable emphasis was placed on standardiza-
tion of the SAMICS methodology to ensure comparability
of results between PV technologies and different time
periods. The SAMICS model was constructed around a
manufacturing facility designed specifically for the pro-
duction of PV modules. The description of the PV facility
included a description of indirect labor requirements
including administrative and managerial personnel. This
provided a standardized set of indirect requirements for
plant and facilities that also is included in the standard-
ized indirect requirements and cost descriptions of the
SAMICS methodology. A standard set of financial param-
eters including rate of return on equity, interest rates,
taxes, and insurance is built into the SAMICS model.
As part of the program, a Cost Account Catalog, con-
taining price information on a wide range of inputs
used in PV module production, has been published.6
The catalog has been updated periodically to reflect
relative changes in the prices of inputs and changes in
the expected rate of inflation. Figure 1 gives an over-
view of the SAMICS methodology.
Users of the Standard Assembly Line Manufactur-
ing Industry Simulation (SAMIS) program, the computer
implementation of the SAMICS methodology, can
change any of the indirect input or financial param-
eters. Leaving these parameters at their initial settings,
however, makes possible direct comparisons of manu-
facturing process technologies. SAMIS has been used
by the FSA Project in comparing several technology
options. It also has been used to track technical pro-
gress over extended periods of time.
SAMIS simulates the operation of a company,
described by the user, to develop detailed estimates of
input utilization, capital requirements, and financial flows
of an operating business. Specifically, a hypothetical fac-
tory is "built," based on manufacturing process descrip-
tions developed by the user. The manufacturing process
description requires the user to specify process inputs.
To simulate the facility's operation, an appropriate work-
force, determined by SAMIS, consists of production
workers, administrators, and managers. The cost of
labor, along with materials, building space, and utilities
are taken from a supporting cost-account catalog. A
detailed financial model is applied to determine the costs
of operation, including depreciation, taxes, insurance,
and amortization of one-time startup costs.
The SAMIS computer program has extensive
report-generating capabilities. Reports include indi-
vidual process descriptions that indicate use of indi-
The SAMIS computer program implements this methodology by simulation:
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Figure 1. SAMICS Methodology Overview
vidual inputs and their cost, company-wide summaries
of inputs, and a complete set of financial reports
covering the operation of the company.
reporting format. A table is produced that lists the value-
added price of each process and the contribution of
labor, materials, bUilding space, equipment, and utilities
to process cost.
The recently developed personal-computer ver-
sion of the SAMIS program has two additional modes
of operation: Solar Array Manufacturing Price Estima-
tion Guidelines (SAMPEG) and Improved Price Estima-
tion Guidelines (IPEG). SAMPEG is expected to be
used in most cases because it provides much quicker
estimates of process costs (usually less than 5 min)
than SAMIS with only a small sacrifice in accuracy.
SAM PEG was developed using a combination of
SAMIS and the IPEG model. The latter is a much simpler
linear approximation for SAMIS. SAMPEG employs the
data-manager and manufacturing-process sequencing
algorithms from SAMIS with factory construction, staffing
approximations, and financial submodels of IPEG. These
approximations and shorter run times dictate a limited
IPEG, like SAMPEG, provides quick estimates of
the results of a more detailed SAMIS simulation. IPEG
calculates process cost from five overhead factors. The
overhead factors usually are generated by a prior SAMIS
simulation. These overhead factors convert direct inputs
of equipment, labor, materials, utilities, and floor space
into an estimate of product cost. IPEG users quickly and
efficiently can explore effects of changes in each of
these direct input categories. Essentially, the IPEG model
has been constructed so that sensitivity studies can be
made of the effect on costs if anyone of a number of
financial assumptions in the SAMIS model is changed.
Ranges for a parameter can be specified, and the results
of changing the parameter can be displayed in tabular
form and/or plotted on the monitor.
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that various growth rates will be achieved as shown in
Figure 3. Similar distributions are developed to reflect the
outcome of R&D work on other elements of the network.
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B. SIMRAND
SIMRAND is a generalized method for analysis of
the information available for making decisions in a
R&D environment. The first step in the process is to
delineate the network of paths that are consistent with
objectives of the R&D effort. For example, along the
path to make low-eost silicon solar cells, several dif-
ferent methods have been proposed for growing crys-
talline silicon feedstock. Each of these techniques
generates a new path that could be followed by a
research program. An example of a test network for
solar cell module production is shown in Figure 2.
Program management for PV R&D involves complex
choices among alternative research paths for technology
development. To complicate matters further, the informa-
tion available on elements of each research path is often
relatively uncertain in nature. Thus, several outcomes
are possible. SIMRAND was developed specifically to
support decision-making in this uncertain environment.
Under a given set of constraints, SIMRAND can estimate
the probability that a specific research path will be the
best from a network of possible paths. Using the opinions
of experts, SIMRAND directly incorporates the uncer-
tain outlook surrounding elements along each research
path. Wherever possible, objective data are used as a
guide in bounding the parameters in question. The result
is an improved degree of consistency and objectivity in
R&D decision-making.
One other piece of information used by SIMRAND is
a quantitative representation of how decision makers feel
about the various possible outcomes of the research
effort. For example, a decision maker may place a much
greater value on achieving a goal of $1 .OO/Wp, in com-
parison to $1.20/Wp, because of the need to compete
with alternative technologies for generating electricity.
These preferences can be incorporated in a utility func-
tion and included in the SIMRAND evaluation process.
Figure 2. Task Network for Solar-Cell Module
Production
The next step is to define the expected outcome
of R&D work to improve each element in the network.
To continue with our earlier example, experts would be
asked to indicate what growth rates are likely to be
achieved through additional R&D work on silicon ingot
growth by the Czochralski (Cz) process. To capture
the uncertainty in the outlook, experts would be asked
to indicate a range of possible growth rates and how
confident they were that each rate (or a better value)
would be achieved. For example, the experts might
believe there was a 50 % chance of achieving a growth
rate of 1.7 kg/h or better, and a 90 % chance of achiev-
ing a growth rate of 1 .4 kg/h or better. The result is a
cumulative distribution that summarizes the probability
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A Monte Carlo simulation method is used by
SIMRAND to integrate all the information into a single
result. Monte Carlo simulation corresponds to the pro-
cess of throwing a pair of dice many times to estimate
the probability that each outcome, 2 through 12, will
occur. SIMRAND randomly selects a value for each
element in the network. For this single trial, SIMRAND
finds the optimal path through the network from the
cumulative distributions generated by the cognizant
experts. The outcome is tabulated just as one would
record the result of rolling a pair of dice when esti-
mating the probability of various outcomes. SIMRAND
continues with these trials until sufficient information
has been generated to accurately describe the range
of possible outcomes.
Besides evaluation of the outcome of a specific
R&D effort as described by a network, SIMRAND can be
used to measure consequences of adding or eliminating
elements from the network. The SIMRAND simulation
simply is repeated with a new element or an element
removed to see how results are affected. Entirely differ-
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ent research programs also can be compared with
SIMRAND. Unlike similiar methods that focus on the
most likely outcome of elements in a research program,
SIMRAND shows the range of possible outcomes of
carrying out each research program.
gram's goals, although the probability of success was
less than perhaps a lower-payoff option.
C. LCP
SIMRAND was used successfully to compare
various technical options supported by the National
Photovoltaics Research Program. The uncertainty in the
minds of experts about the outcome of various research
efforts were mirrored in the results as they reflected a
wide range of possible outcomes. At times, the results
vindicated support for what was viewed as less attractive
research paths by showing that if these paths were suc-
cessful, the payoff would be high for reaching the Pro-
The need to model PV systems in a specific appli-
cation and under conditions of a specific geographic
location led to the development of the LCP. LCP is a
simulation program capable of modeling the lifetime
performance of a PV array. The product of the LCP
simulation is the electricity output, and cost and reve-
nue streams from the systems operation. Input require-
ments of the LCP model and the output of a LCP
simulation are shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. LCP's Role in the Analysis of the
Performance of a Photo voltaic System
LCP's calculation of system-energy output is based
on the system's electrical design, hourly weather condi-
tions, and long-term variations in power output. Simulat-
ing the system's performance on an hourly basis makes
it possible to calculate revenues under a time-of-day rate
schedule or a block rate schedule. Figure 5 shows an
example of how LCP simulates the load demand and
energy output of a PV system, including the degradation
of system output over time.
Provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act (PURPA) of 1978, Public Law 95-617, require utilities
to purchase electricity from qualifying, distributed, small-
power producers at their net avoided costs. Owners of
qualifying systems have the option to interconnect with
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Figure 5. LCP Load and System Output
Simulation Example
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the utility in either of two ways: a parallel or a simultan-
eous mode. In the parallel mode, excess power gener-
ated is sold back to the utility at avoided costs. In the
simultaneous mode, all electricity produced by the PV
system is sold to the utility at the sell-back rate, while
simultaneously purchasing all energy requirements from
the utility at the normal rate for the customer class. Either
situation can be simulated with the LCP model.
In combination with a financial model, LCP can be
used to explore several important issues in the areas
of system design and application. One example is the
use of LCP in the selection of the best tracking option
for a specific PV system application. Available insola-
tion values and operating temperatures are fed to LCP
for conversion to lifetime output, cost, and revenue
streams. The supporting financial model then is able to
calculate the economic value of the alternative systems.
A number of application issues can be handled
effectively with the combination of LCP and the finan-
cial model. One issue is the operation and maintenance
(O&M) schedule selected for a PV system application.
Both alternative O&M policies can be evaluated in terms
of their cost, incremental energy output, and dollar value.
For example, evaluation of a cleaning program involves
the input of the power gain resulting from each sched-
uled cleaning (based on the cleaning procedure, module
cover material, and type of detergent), the number of
cleanings for each month of the year, and the site-specific
environmental conditions (i.e., the dirt-accumulation rates
and the effects of precipitation). LCP has been used to
show that the correct selection of an O&M schedule
can lead to significant cost savings during a PV
system's lifetime.
D. PVARRAY
PA&I developed the PVARRAY model to simulate
array performance with the passage of time. The eco-
nomic evaluation of solar cell technologies requires a
technical assessment of their lifetime performance.
PVARRAY can model the effect of random solar cell
failure on system performance and adjust for various
strategies of failed module replacement.
PVARRAY simulates the power output of a PV array
during its lifetime. The PVARRAY model includes the
ability to compare performance of different module
designs, the capacity to consider alternative series-
parallel wiring schemes, and the ability to evaluate
alternative replacement strategies for different cell-
failure rates and bypass-diode placements.
The combination of PVARRAY, SAMICS, and LCP
has been used by PA&I to estimate the net present value
of energy from a PV system during its useful lifetime.
Manufacturing costs for the module-production sequence
have been estimated using SAMICS, and the Iife-cycle
cost and performance have been simulated using LCP in
combination with PVARRAY. The three programs have
allowed PA&I to calculate the cost of different module
designs and to determine the time-dependent economic
impact of design changes by simulating array perform-
ance and Iife-cycle cost (Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Example of Cell Degradation and Lifetime Performance for Three Different Module Designs
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E. CELLOPT
The PA&I team periodically was called upon to
apply operations research methods directly to techni-
cal problems. An example of this type of activity was
the effort to optimize the metallization grid pattern on a
PV cell. The problem had many interdependent attri-
butes to consider: resistance losses in the metal grid
and silicon, shadowing losses, metallization reliability
and service life, and cost. An interactive computer
program, Cell Optimization Model (CELLOPT), was
developed to assist engineers in the design of current-
collecting, metal-grid patterns for solar cells. Given a
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cell shape, silicon resistivity, metallization material,
and metal application method, the methodology con-
structs a grid pattern to keep to a minimum the cell
power loss that arises from the current-eollecting
mechanisms. The program does not directly incor-
porate cost considerations. The CELLOPT output,
however, can be used by SAMICS to calculate manu-
facturing cost sensitivities. These, in turn, can be used
in the LCP model to ascertain life-cycle cost effective-
ness of a specific metallization pattern.
SECTION V
Major Studies
The charter of PA&I was to support the decision-
making process of Project management. This was to
be done with quantitative studies of the status and
future prospects of a wide range of technical develop-
ment options. The studies typically involved interac-
tions with both technical areas of the Project and with
industry to acquire the technical parameters necessary
to estimate the economic characteristics of a piece of
equipment, a process or sequence of processes, or a
product. Technical information then was translated into
economic information by exercising one or more of the
models described in Section IV. Results were compiled
and distributed to interested parties to aid the decision
process.
The totality of studies performed by PA&I since
1975 is much too large for detailed listing since the
analysis function has been essentially a continuous
process. Many studies were "quick-look" estimates
performed for DOE management and/or in response to
some event occurring outside the JPL PV Project. A
significant number of studies involved sensitive infor-
mation held proprietary by industry. Although the pro-
prietary information at times was very detailed and
extensive, no proprietary concern ever was violated
by PA&I.
In this section, the only studies mentioned are those
that affected the course of the FSA Project, the DOE
Program, or were milestone assessments. Quantitative
results are limited to landmark studies. Generally, the
studies are presented in chronological order and their
effect on the direction of PV development is described.
Note that quantitative results of studies reported are
stated in different base-year dollars. This reflects the
adjustment of Program goals and milestone statements
to the changing value of the dollar over time.
A. GUIDELINES FOR PRICE ALLOCATION
The JPL PV Project was divided into several techni-
cal tasks involving the manufacture of PV modules: sili-
con feedstock, silicon wafer or sheet, cell and module
fabrication, and encapsulation materials. The combined
objective for these efforts was the Project goal to develop
technology able to produce PV modules with a selling
price of $O.50/Wp (1974 dollars), free on board (FOB)
factory dock. To assist in management of the effort, the
Project goal was subdivided or allocated among the
various technical tasks. This was done on an "equal
pain" basis, taking into account the difficulty of the prob-
lem, the maturity of the technology, and the industrial
resources available to attack the problems at hand. The
first PAGs were presented in the Second Project Integra-
tion Meeting (PIM) of the LSSA Project in April 1976.
From that time, the PAG has been updated whenever it
became apparent that any of the allocation criteria had
changed. An example of a Guideline is shown in Table 2
from the 1978 PAG (Reference 12).
Table 2. Example of 1978 Ingot Technology Price Allocation Guidelines (Reference 12)*
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986
Encapsulated Cell Efficiency (%) 11.5 13 14 15 16.9
Module Efficiency (%) 8.6 10.1 11.2 12.8 14.4
Guidelines Goals
Silicon $/kg 65 60 40 17 10
$/Wp 1.42 1.10 0.47 0.19 0.095
Sheet $/m2sheet 214 129 90 54 18
(value added) $/Wp 2.33 1.24 0.72 0.38 0.112
Cells $/m2cell 200 120 52 30 22
(value added) $/Wp 1.74 0.92 0.37 .20 0.130
Encapsulation $/m2 module 30 25 15 10 8
materials $/Wp 0.35 0.25 0.13 0.08 0.055
Module $/m2module 100 50 34 20 15.5
(value added) $/Wp 1.16 0.49 0.31 0.15 0.108
Totals $/m2 module 602 404 224 128 72
$/Wp 7.00 4.00 2.00 1.00 0.50
• Although the stated goal at that time called for modules of at least 10% efficiency, the efficiency was traded off
against module cost. It was realized at that time that module efficiencies considerably greater than 10% were
highly probable.
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A Cz ingot-based production sequence was
chosen for analysis. Wherever possible, actual
measured parameters were used to minimize assump-
tions. As with all such economic studies, there was no
assurance that all the newly developed technology
would be adopted by industry and collocated in a
single factory.
The ground rules of this study were that all equip-
ment must either have been in use in the industry or
existed as tested prototypes to ensure that process
parameters were well understood. Both equipment and
processes had to be capable of being adopted by
industry by the end of FY 82 and be capable of pro-
ducing PV modules for sale at $2.80/Wp (1980 dollars)
or less.
The first major milestone of the National Photo-
voltaics Program was achievement of technical readi-
ness for a technology capable of producing PV modules
for sale at $2.80/Wp (1980 dollars) by the end of FY 82.
In the summer of 1980, PA&I initiated a detailed assess-
ment of the status of the developing technology to ascer-
tain if there existed processes, equipment, and materials
sufficient to meet this milestone.
internally self-eonsistent methodology for ranking the pro-
posals. The proposal evaluation process proved to be
very effective. In several instances, when proposals that
seemed very attractive technologically were examined
using the methodology, it became apparent that some of
the suggested innovations actually would have increased
the cost of PV modules. From the 55 proposals sub-
mitted, 14 were selected for award.
The module fabrication sequence chosen repre-
sented the best technology ready for adoption at that
time. The cell and module performance parameters
chosen had been confirmed by laboratory and field tests
for cells and modules using that fabrication sequence.
The factory size was chosen large enough (30 MW/year)
to capture most economies of scale. This was done to
ensure that true economic capabilities of the technology
were not obscured by scale inefficiencies associated
with small manufacturing operations.
At the conclusion of the "Near-Term Cost-Reduction"
contracts in 1981, PA&I participated in an assessment
of the results of the development effort and compared
those results to the benefits predicted 3 years earlier
during the proposal evaluation process. Of the 14 con-
tracts, five failed technically and resulted in no cost
reduction; four resulted in cost reductions, but some-
what less than predicted, and five resulted in cost
reductions greater than predicted (Reference 14).
D. TECHNICAL READINESS ASSESSMENT FOR
$2.80/Wp MODULES (1980)
Results of the study are shown in Table 3 for the
principal production steps. These results, presented at
the 16th PIM, September 1980, indicated the technol-
ogy had been developed to the point where the first
first detailed, bottom-up SAMICS analysis of
the cost manufacturing PV modules occurred in 1977
with the publication of "Economic Analysis of a Candi-
date 50/Wp Flat-Plate Photovoltaic Manufacturing Tech-
nology" (Reference 13). The analysis assumed a large
(250 MW/year) based on edge-defined, film-fed
growth (EFG) silicon ribbon. For the first time, the study
showed that ribbon technologies, if technically success-
had the economic capability to meet or exceed the
price A corollary study in 1978 examined a
candidate factory based on Cz silicon solar cells.
For the first these studies delineated in detail
the requirements both for a long-range, large-scale PV
and a near-term, moderate-scale factory. Quanti-
tative sensitivities of final product price to various
technical and economic factors were visible in an
i'"'t,~r,",,,II,, self-consistent format. The results of these
studies formed the economic foundation that guided
the technical thrusts in silicon ribbon-based
and the near-term thrust in ingot-based
C. NEAR-TERM COST-REDUCTION "TSONGAS"
PROCUREMENT (1978 TO 1981)
8. CANDIDATE FACTORIES FOR $0.50/Wp
TECHNOLOGY (1977)
were the statement of what
be necessary for each technical task to accomplish
to reach the goal. The SAMICS methodology,
described in Section then was applied to examine
the of various technical options to meet the
task allocation goals and the overall Project price goal.
the years of the JPL Project, only four major
issuances of the PAGs were made (1976, 1978, 1980,
and 1984). The 1984 update was a major modification
of the PAG because of the much more stringent require-
ments on manufacturing cost and module efficiency that
were called for in the DOE five-Year Research Plan of
983. Comparison of the 'top-down" allocation with
the detailed "bottom-up" SAMICS analysis provided an
ovt,rorY"lol\l powerful procedure for sorting out the most
promising cost-effective technical options.
1 a congressional initiative was imple-
mented for the "Near-Term Cost Reduction in Photo-
vOlt8ICS." known more commonly as the "Tsongas"
prc)cuJernelnt after the Congressman who initiated the
""n",hlinn legislc,tion. Some 55 proposals, ranging over
entire of PV technologies, were received
evaluation. Because the purpose of the procure-
to solicit ideas for technological developments
immediate 2 to 4 years) impact on the
of a way was needed to quickly eval-
the numerous proposals. Proposals were evaluated
the basis of potential payoff, risk of failure, cost to the
Prnnr",m cost of technology transfer, and timeliness
the proposed development were to prove
successful. PA&I worked with FSA Project management,
and Procurement and Legai Counsel to develop an
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major DOE PV Program milestone of $2.80/Wp
technology had been met (Reference 15).
Table 3. Price Summary for Principal Manufac-
turing Steps for 1982 PV Crystalline-
Silicon Technology
In 1982, events of the 2 years
reviewed to ascertain the extent to which the forecast
potential PV module cost reduction had been realized.
Ground rules for this review were all ",n,lirHnc."t
processes had to be in actual use in the PV
not necessariiy collocated in one manufacturer's
Technology Steps
Ingot Growth (including silicon
feedstock)
Wafering
Cell processing
Module assembly (including
encapsulation material)
* 1980 dollars.
$/Wp*
$1.63
0.37
0.36
0.34
$2.70
Results of the review, shown in Table 4, were pre-
sented in January 1983 at the 21 st PIM 1
In comparing the FOB factory dock the
capabilities of the actual 1982 were
better than had been projected 2 years earlier.
how the caiculated price compared to actual
prices, some additional assumptions and Rrlillo::tnnAnto::
had to be made. Marketing and
not included in the SAMIS model, had to be added.
Although manufacturers are reluctant to reveal rn<:>rk-",i,'nn
and distribution costs, PA&I was able to elicit manu-
facturers that the range of 30 to 50% was reasonable.
Inflation from 1980 to 1982, in the 1980
to be 14.5%, actually was 25.4%.
Table 4. Comparison of the $2. 80/Wp Technical Readiness Projection Made in 1980 for 1982 with Actual 1982
Industrial Practices (Reference 16)
Projection Made
in 1980 for 1982a
(1980$/Wp)
30 MW/yr
1982 State of the
(1
30 2
Ingot growth (including silicon)
Wafering
Cell processing
Module assembly (including encapsulation material)
FOB factory dock required price
Marketing and distribution (30 to 50 %)
Inflation (1980-1982) (14.5% estimated, 25.4% actual)
Required market price,b 1982$/Wp
1.63
0.37
0.36
0.34
2.70
0.81-1.35
0.89-1.03
4.40-5.08
1.53
0.42
0.31
0.37
2.63
0.79-1.31
0.87-1.00
4.29-4.94
1.74
0.77
0.92
4.27
.28-2.13
.41-1.63
6.97-8.03
aAssumes 11.4% encapsulated-cell efficiency and a 0.78 packing factor.
bTo convert to $/m2 of module, multiply by 89.4.
When these adjustments were made, the required
market price of modules in 1982 dollars was in the range
of $4.29 to $4.94/Wp. In December 1982, 1 month after
the completion of the study, the winning bid in a competi-
tive procurement was submitted by a module manufac-
turer that had adopted most of the technology assumed
in the study. The bid of $4.95/Wp was for a large num-
ber of modules to be used by a utility.
Also included in the study was a calculation of the
required price of PV modules using the same technology,
but produced on a much smaller scale of 2 MW/year.
This scale was typical of most PV module manufac-
turers at that time. The results for 2 MW/year, shown
in Table 4, were in the range of from $7 to $8/Wp
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(1982 dollars), including and distribution.
This corresponds very well to the
for large purchases of PV modules at that time.
E. JPL/SERI JOINT ASSESSMENT OF
CRYSTALLINE-SILICON SHEET (1981)
In the summer of 1981 , the FSA PA&I was faced
with an extremely difficult and delicate the
request of the DOE PV Program Office, the various
crystalline sheet options were to be listed descend-
ing priority in anticipation of sharp reductions the
number of options being funded by DOE. A total of
different options were being pursued by JPL and SERI.
Each option had its vocal constituency both within and
outside the institutions. Also, several sheet options had
multiple options for ancillary requirements such as saw-
ing or silicon feedstock. These affected the economic
and technical viability of the sheet option. Eventually,
18 different paths were identified for silicon sheet,
even when assuming commonality wherever possible in
cell and module processing.
The task facing PA&I was to organize and con-
duct a joint JPL/SERI study and to arrive at a consen-
sus between the two institutions on recommendations
for which options should be continued and which should
be terminated. At that time, for more than a year, PA&I
had been developing SIMRAND, a decision-aid method-
ology for application to just such multiple-option prob-
lems as the silicon sheet study posed by DOE. It was
decided to apply SIMRAND, described in Section IV of
this report, to the problem. In part, SIMRAND had its
origins in the "Tsongas" procurement, a problem similar
to the priority-rating of silicon sheet options.
Several preliminary planning meetings were held
at SERI and JPL to carefully develop the ground rules
for the study and to familiarize all participants with a
decision process that formally incorporated uncertainty
with technical and economic point estimates. At the
outset, the enthusiasm of the participants for the
SIMRAND approach varied markedly. As the study
progressed, however, the value of the process
became apparent to most of those involved.
The bulk of the data discussions took place in two
2-day meetings at JPL chaired by the PA&I Area Mana-
ger and supported by PA&I analysts. Each variable
was discussed for all sheet options. For example, cell
efficiencies for cells fabricated from each sheet material
were discussed. A consensus was reached that the effi-
ciency distributions for each silicon sheet option was
consistent with the knowledge of that material, and
consistent relative to the efficiency distributions of
other sheet options. The discussion then would move to
the next variable, such as yield, for each of the sheet
options. This ensured some measure of uniformity in the
underlying assumptions across all sheet options. Pro-
ceeding in this manner, consensus was reached for each
variable for all the sheet options. IPEG calculations were
performed as needed to support the discussions.
Cumulative probability distributions were generated
for each variable. These distributions were entered into
the SIMRAND computer program. Through a Monte
Carlo simulation, probability distributions for individual
variables were combined into a single distribution for
the cost of the module. Cumulative probability distri-
butions were generated for each silicon sheet option.
Although the discussions were highly spirited at times,
the SIMRAND process, by formally excluding extra-
neous issues, provided an internal self consistency
that permitted progress toward a consensus.
It is noteworthy that consensus was reached on all
issues. The findings of the joint JPUSERI team were pre-
sented to the DOE PV Program Office and subsequently
20
almost all the team's recommendations were enacted by
DOE. The results are summarized in an unpublished
"white paper" report to DOE (Reference 17).
F. DEVELOPMENT OF "IDENTIFICATION AND
COSTING OF BASIC PROCESSING UNITS"
HANDBOOK (1981 TO 1982)
With the rapid emergence of new thin-film solar cell
technologies, it became apparent that a new database of
information would be needed to evaluate the progress
and potential of these new technologies. The database
would cover leading manufacturing processes for thin-
film solar cell module production. Using the experience
and database developed through many prior cost-
assessments for silicon solar cell technology, it was
shown that the large number of processes that might be
used could be reduced to a much smaller and manage-
able list of "basic processing units." In 1981, JPL pro-
posed to develop for SERI a simplified methodology and
handbook for the rapid, rough estimation of process
costs based on the use of basic processing units.
The handbook that resulted from this effort
(Reference 18) consisted of descriptions and cost
estimates for the basic processing units identified as
representative of the manufacturing technology for
thin-film solar cell modules. The process descriptions
identified costs by principal categories, making it easy
to adjust the description and estimate of cost to a
specific production sequence and technology. The
most sensitive parameters for individual process costs
also were singled out, and sensitivity curves were
generated showing the response of cost to variations
in this input parameter. With this material, users of the
handbook qUickly can construct a cost estimate of both
the processes in a PV module fabrication sequence and
the total cost. Beginning with a process sequence
description, process costs are taken from the handbook.
If there are significant changes in the most sensitive
parameter for the estimate of cost, the estimate can be
read directly from the sensitivity curve for the process
parameter. The handbook has proven itself useful in the
study of manufacturing processes and the development
of quick estimates of process costs.
The handbook of "basic processing units" was
updated in 1986. It was extended to cover promising
new manufacturing processes for thin-film technolo-
gies. The basic processing units are available as part
of the SAMIS package of cost-estimating procedures
that can be obtained through COSMIC.
G. SILICON COST ANALYSIS (1983)
By the fall of 1983, the polysilicon feedstock
development task was being phased out of the FSA
Project. Early in the Project, a contract had been
issued to an academic institution (Lamar University,
Beaumont, Texas) to estimate and track the costs of
silicon from the numerous proposed production methods.
Many point estimates had been made using standard
industrial cost engineering technologies. In 1983, PA&I
conducted a study of the surviving candidate silicon pro-
duction methods to assess the capability for producing
low-eost silicon. This study once again demonstrated the
value and power of SIMRAND to produce internally con-
sistent comparisons that are a requirement for sound
management (Reference 19).
The silicon-cost study applied the SIMRAND tech-
nique, described in Section IV of this document, to a
projection of the cost of silicon from future large pro-
duction plants using technology developed during the
FSA Project. Inputs to the SIMRAND model were
based on updates of the Lamar University estimates.
In SIMRAND, however, probabilities are assigned to
the point estimates. An immediate result was the dis-
covery that point estimates for different technologies,
which previously had been used to compare cost of
product, had very different probabilities of achieve-
ment in the opinion of a broad spectrum of experts in
the field. When compared on an equal probability
basis, the candidate silicon process in second place
(the process developed by Hemlock Semiconductor,
Inc.) became much more cost competitive with the
Union Carbide leading-candidate process.
H. ECONOMIC COMPARISON OF FLOAT-ZONE
AND CZOCHRALSKI TECHNOLOGY (1984)
In 1983, the reorientation of the National Photo-
voltaics Program toward high-efficiency modules (16 %
and above) prompted a reexamination of options for
silicon material capable of the required cell efficiencies
(Reference 20). Among the candidate sheet materials
proven capable of producing high-efficiency cells was
the float-zone (FZ) ingot material.
The FZ-ingot option was briefly examined early in
the Project. Although it was known that very high crystal
quality could be obtained with FZ, the state of crystal
growing technology for Cz was more advanced. The
semiconductor industry was moving toward large-diameter
Cz ingots, a direction seemingly fortuitous in meeting the
requirements for photovoltaics. At that early time, the
goals of the National Photovoltaics Program required
only a 10% efficient module that could be obtained by
Cz technology without resorting to the less-developed
FZ method. Restructuring of the Photovoltaics Pro-
gram goals to 15 % efficient modules, however, put
stringent requirements on the bulk properties of the sili-
con wafer material before it starts into the cell processing
sequence. With further development, Cz material prob-
ably would be able to meet these requirements, but FZ
materia! could fulfill most of the bulk property require-
ments at that time. Although FZ material was acceptable,
the crystal production methods require further technology
development to be acceptable for large-scale manufac-
turing.
Under the assumption of equivalent cell efficiencies,
results of the analysis indicated a slightly lower $/Wo
and $/m2 cost for a FZ process when compared to a
CZ-based process. If it is assumed for identical cell
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and module-fabrication sequences that FZ wafers will
result in a higher cell efficiency than Cz wafers, the
disparity in the results increase further in favor of FZ.
A more conservative cost for the polysilicon feedstock
was used for FZ because of the requirement for feed-
stock in rod form.
The principal difference between the assumptions
for the two technologies was uncertainty in the crystal
growth parameters. The assumptions for Cz were widely
reviewed for more than a decade and, for the most part,
demonstrated in practice. Conversely, FZ crystal growth
is still very much an art, and technology development
would be required, with all its attendent uncertainties, to
fabricate production FZ-growers with the capabilities
assumed in this study. The payoff for such a develop-
ment effort could be an increase in the absolute
efficiency of modules.
I. PARAMETER SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF
PHOTOVOLTAlC SYSTEMS (1984 TO 1985)
By 1984, the network of models developed by
PA&I had been completed. It was possible to trace
analytically the life cycle of photovoltaics from the
purification costs of the silicon feedstock through
crystal growth, cell and module fabrication, installation
and operation in the field and, ultimately, the decom-
missioning and salvaging of power plants at end-of-life.
This powerful set of models allowed one to assess the
sensitivity, of both life-cycle costs and cost per kWh,
to changes in cost or performance at any point in the
manufacture and operation of a PV power plant. By
1984, a considerable experimental database had been
accumulated by module manufacturers and power plant
operators. Based on these factors, PA&I initiated a major
sensitivity study of flat-plate PV systems.
The purpose of the sensitivity study was to pro-
vide a guide for Program planning and technology
assessments that would permit a user flexibility over a
broad spectrum of PV system parameters. Using the
relationship between lifetime cost and system perform-
ance parameters, analytical tests were made to see
how overall PV system energy costs are affected by
changes in the various goals set for module cost and
efficiency, system component costs and efficiencies,
O&M costs, and indirect costs.
An analysis was made of how the competitiveness
of PV systems is affected by regional differences in com-
peting energy costs and solar insolation levels. The sen-
sitivity of competing energy costs (coal, combustion tur-
bine, and combined cycle oil-fired generators) to escala-
tion rates for capital and fuel was explored. Alternative
tracking configurations (fixed, one-axis, and two-axis
tracking) also were introduced into the sensitivity
analysis.
Goal values for PV system parameters were
reviewed on the basis of the most recent research find-
ings. Sensitivity tests were made to see how research
progress in areas such as power-related, BOS cost
affected the combinations of module cost and module
efficiency that meet Program goals for system energy
costs (Reference 21). The results were an extensive set
of tables that related the sensitivity of important system
parameters to changes in other system parameters. This
provides the system designer with insight into the effect
a specific set of parameters will have on overall system
economic performance.
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J. FSA PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
COMPARED TO CHERRY HILL GOALS (1985)
In 1985, nearing the end of the FSA Project, a
study was undertaken to assess the economic conse-
quences of the technical achievements of the Project
from its inception. In an internally consistent process,
these results were compared to the results envisioned
by the Cherry Hill conferees in 1973. Three of the four
PA&I managers who served during the life of the Project
authored a paper presented at the 18th Institute of Elec-
trical and Electronic Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) Photovoltaic
Specialists Conference (Reference 22). The principal find-
ings of this study are presented in detail in Section VI of
this document.
SECTION VI
Progress in Crystalline-Silicon Technology
When the FSA Project was formed in January 1975,
the PV industry was using some rather expensive
materials for module manufacturing. The PV industry
also was small and highly labor-intensive. The FSA
Project planners envisioned a path that would lead to a
dramatic decline in the price of terrestrial PV modules,
from the range of $70 to $120/Wp (1985 dollars) in
1974, as shown in Figure 7, to the Cherry Hill goal of
$1 .07/Wp (1985 dollars) in 1985.
MODULE COST
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Figure 7. State-of-the-Art Projections for
Czochralski Module Technology (1974
to 1985)
This section reviews the progress made in crystalline-
silicon technology from 1974 to 1985. The reader should
be cautioned that the numbers presented here reflect the
potential of the technology in the limit of high production
volume, and not the market prices at each point in time.?
A. CZOCHRALSKITECHNOLOGY
Figure 7 displays state-of-the-art Cz technology at
several points in time.8 The major contributions to prod-
uct cost are broken out by principal process category.9
The state-of-the-art factories of Figure 7 assume
that the most advanced technology available to a man-
ufacturer at that date is collocated in a single factory
and scaled-up to a point where most economies-of-
scale have been captured. This prevents differences
attributable to scale economies from obscuring eco-
nomic differences inherent in the technologies.
As shown in Figure 7, an astounding improvement in
the state-of-the-art technology took place in the 4 years
after 1974. By 1978, expensive materials such as sili-
cone pottants and double-glass encapsulants were being
replaced by polyvinyl butyral (PVB) and single-glass con-
struction. Cz ingots (2- and 3-in. diameter) were replaced
by 4-in.-diameter ingots. Module efficiency had improved
substantially, and cell fabrication and module assembly,
although still labor intensive, was done on a non-
automated, assembly-line basis.
By 1980, prototype large-scale production equip-
ment had been developed by contractors to the JPL
Project. Notable among this equipment were automated,
large-diameter, Cz-ingot growers along with new appa-
ratus for cell processing, module assembly, and lamina-
tion. Yield and efficiency improvements reduced all man-
ufacturing requirements for a given production level.
New, long-life, inexpensive materials such as ethylene
vinyl acetate (EVA) were being developed for encapsula-
tion. A systematic test and failure analysis program at
JPL allowed industry to avoid many costly failures in the
field and to rectify quickly those that did occur. The engi-
neering of the entire array as an integrated structure
eliminated redundant structural material.
7This section summarizes the principal findings of a silicon-crystalline study (Reference 22) that were presented at the
18th IEEE Photovoltaic Specialists Conference in October 1985. The results are not in strict agreement with the IEEE
study because an estimate of inflation for 1985 (4 %) was used in the study. Results presented here use the actual
1985 rate of inflation (3.7%).
8"State-of-the-art" refers to technology that has been developed, but is not necessarily used in production.
9The 1978 and later results are from state-of-the-art SAMICS analysis performed at JPL (References 15 and 16). The
1974 data are from the "Hearings Before the Subcomittee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, June 6 and 11 , 1974." The information is presented there as a manufacturing direct cost that is not in a form
that permits a SAMICS analysis.
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Table 6. Assumptions Used in Module Price
Analysis: 1985 Czochra/ski Technology
At the time of the Cherry Hill conference, little was
known about BOS costs for large-scale PV electrical
generation plants. It was the early 1980s before BOS
parameters were defined adequately to allow a state-
ment of the PV goals in more relevant terms of $/kWh
energy price to the user.
As stated previously, when the Cherry Hill goals
for PV modules are combined with the BOS costs and
financial parameters used in the DOE Five-Year
Research Plan, the selling price of the energy pro-
duced by the system is $0.263/kWh (1985 dollars).
Comparison of this number with previous calculations,
shown in Tables 5 and 6, shows that Cz technology,
for all intents and purposes, fulfilled the technology-
development part of the Cherry Hill promise.
The cumulative effect of these developments, shown
in Figure 7, shows how technical advances, combined
with economies of scale, produce large reductions in
manufacturing cost. Unfortunately, because of market
conditions and shifting priorities in the National Photo-
voltaics Program, actual production levels were in the
range of 1 to 5 MW/year, well below the level needed to
capture full economies of scale. Technology transfer had
also slowed appreciably in recent years. Consequently,
market prices leveled off well above the price the tech-
nology was capable of reaching.
B. STATUS OF CRYSTALLINE-SILICON
TECHNOLOGY IN 1985
A more detailed analysis of 1985 state-of-the art
manufacturing using Cz technology is given in Tables 5
and 6. All assumed equipment and processes were in
actual use or existed as production prototypes. Thus, if
production were to start in 1988, more than 2 years
would be required for today's state-of-the art technology
to be installed in a 25-MW/year factory. Wafering param-
eters are assumed to continue their moderate improve-
ment through 1988. The assumed cell and module fabri-
cation processes already were individually proven in
the production of modules. Results show that if mod-
ules of 13.5 % efficiency [under standard test condi-
tions (STC)]10 could be produced, then a price of
$1 .44/Wp (1985 dollars) 0: $0.68/Wp (1974 dollars~
would be required for profitable operation. When this
cost and efficiency are used to calculate energy price
using the methodology and assumptions found in the
current DOE Five-Year Research Plan, an energy price
of $0.274/kWh (1985 dollars) is the result.
Table 5. Projected Price of Manufactured Module
Using State-of-the-Art Czochra/ski
Technology
Process 1985$
Factory size
Year of production
Silicon cost
Crystallization rate
Ingot diameter
Wafer thickness and kerf
Sawing blade plunge rate
Sawing yield
Cell size (modified
square shape)
Area per cell
Packing factor (percentage
of module as solar cells)
Module size
Module power
Encapsulated cell efficiency
Module efficiency (STC)
25 MWp/yr
1988
$43/kg (1985$)
1.5 kg/h (Cz)
5 in.
19 mils
2.0 in.lmin
95%
9.83 x 9.83 cm
94.6 cm2
91.4%
122 x 61 cm (4 x 2 ft)
101 Wp
14.8%
13.5%
Silicon material
Ingot growth
Ingot wafering
Cell fabrication
Module assembly
Module price
Energy price (using
baseline parameters of the
National Photovoltaics
Program)
0.389
0.367
0.303
0.207
0.178
$1 .44/Wp (1985$)
$0.274/kWh
C. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR CRYSTALLlNE-
SILICON TECHNOLOGY
As shown in Table 5, more than 70 % of the total
required price for Cz modules in this projection is in
the production of the unprocessed wafer. This tech-
nology area still is most in need of cost reduction. Sili-
con ribbon technologies show considerable promise of
significantly reducing wafer costs because the sawing
step is completely eliminated, and some ribbon tech-
nologies are quite conservative in usage of silicon
material. Some ribbon materials also are capable of
producing cells approximately equivalent to Cz in solar
conversion efficiency.
10Measured at 25°C, Air Mass 1.5 spectrum, and 100-mW/cm2 insolation.
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Table 8. Assumptions Used in Module Price
Analysis: 1992 Dendritic Web
Technology
Table 7. Projected Price of Manufactured
Module Using 1992 Dendritic Web
Technology
S/M
EFFECT OF WEB GROWTH RATE
ON MODULE PRODUCTION COSTS (19855)
Figure 8. Effect of Web Growth-Rate on Module
Production Costs (1985 dollars)
Figure 8 shows the importance of improvements in
silicon ribbon growth rates. The projected 2Q-cm2/min
growth rate for 1992 will allow dendritic web tech-
nology to exceed the original goals set at Cherry Hill.
Additional research to improve efficiency and increase
ribbon growth rates to the 30-cm2/min range would bring
module production costs close to current National
Program goals.
Subsequent to the 1985 Cz and ribbon studies,
significant progress has been made in laboratory,
single-crystal cell efficiencies. This development is
especially important because cell efficiencies greater
than 20% were achieved in relatively large cells (4 cm2).
This indicates that efficiency assumptions for the 1985
study were unnecessarily conservative. If laboratory
techniques for improving efficiency can be successfully
adapted for industrial-scale cell production, then the price
per watt for crystalline-silicon PV modules would be con-
siderably less than indicated by the 1985 study. Because
increases in module efficiency reduce total power-plant
area-related costs, further increases in cell efficiencies
would reduce the price per kilowatt-hour of electricity
generated. If both laboratory efficiencies can be
approached in large-scale production, and ribbon growth
rates improved, it is conceivable that the DOE goals can
be surpassed by crystalline-silicon photovoltaics.
200
1.40 190
180
1.30
170
1.20
160
150
1.10
140
1.00 130
120
0.90
2OcjkWh
110
0.80
0
1.50
S/Wp
r----,.----,-------r------,-..,
25 MW/yr
1992
$37/kg (1985$)
20 cm2/min
18
4790 cm2
68.2 Wp
14.6 %
94%
13.7%
1985$
0.153
0.341
0.119
0.162
0.244
$1 .02/Wp (1985$)
$0.220/kWh
Process
Silicon material
Web growth
Cell formation
Metallization
Module assembly
Module price
Energy price (using baseline
parameters of the National
Photovoltaics Program
Factory size
Year of production
Silicon cost
Web growth rate
Growth machines/operator
Module area
Module power
Encapsulated cell efficiency
Packing factor
Module efficiency (STC)
The results of a SAMICS simulation of a possible
future dendritic web ribbon-based PV factory are shown in
Tables 7 and 8. The production year assumed is 1992,
with production cost-estimates based on present state-
of-the-art cell and module fabrication techniques,
scaled up to 25 MW/year. The assumed web growth
rates of 20 cm2/min and module efficiency of 13.7%
reflect projected developments in the technology. The
resulting price required for profitable operation is
$1 .02/Wp (1985 dollars) or $0.49/Wp (1974 dollars).
Because the efficiency actually is considerably higher,
this cost easily beats the original Cherry Hill goal of
$0.50/Wp. To approach the current National Photo-
voltaics Program goals, however; ribbon growth-rates
would have to increase significantly. The effect of den-
dritic web ribbon growth rates on module production
cost is shown in Figure 8. As shown, some improvement
in efficiency and a growth rate of more than 30 cm2/min
are required to meet the current goal.
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SECTION
Lessons and Legacies
The PA&I activity was the first of its kind at JPL.
PA&I developed the depth, breadth, and autonomy to
carry out the broad spectrum of activities involving
model development, detailed technology assessment,
and decision analysis required to support the FSA
Project. PA&I assessment and analysis work provided
Project management with a solid point of departure for
folding in the diverse factors such as budgetary, organi-
zational, and legislative constraints that influence a man-
agement decision. From this storehouse of experience,
many lessons were learned that should help any future
activity of a similar nature to avoid some of the pitfalls,
failures, and false starts that at times befell FSA PA&I.
Some of the most important lessons learned and the
legacy left by PA&I are discussed in this section.
A. LESSONS LEARNED
Choose goals with great care. A properly struc-
tured project goal can be of great help in providing
cohesiveness and direction to a project. Conversely, a
poorly structured goal can be divisive, spawning ineffi-
cient use of resources and leading to external percep-
tions of poor progress or failure when, in fact, signifi-
cant progress is being made.
Goals should be structured to include only those
parameters over which the project has some control.
The FSA Project was a joint Government-industry-
university effort to develop technology that would later
be used by a privately scaled-up industry. The extent to
which that scale-up would occur was completely depen-
dent on market and financial conditions in industry, over
which the Project had no control. Consequently, the
early-stated goal of a 500 MW/year production rate by
1985 was not an appropriate Project goal. Some criti-
cism was heard that the Project was failing when the
500-MW/year goal appropriately was abandoned later.
It was abandoned in part because analysis showed
those production levels were not necessary to capture
economies-of-scale, and because of the realization that
the industry simply was not going to expand that fast.
The corrollary lesson is that abandonment of an inap-
propriate or irrelevant goal will be interpreted in some
quarters as failure.
The goal statement of a technology-development
project, such as FSA, should contain limits of what
can be accomplished. It was several years into the
Project before the $0.50/Wp goal (later updated for
inflation to $0.70/Wp in 1980 dollars) was consistently
stated in the correct terms of "developing the tech-
nology that, if scaled up, would be capable of produc-
ing PV modules for the FOB price of $0.70/Wp." The
point is that the Project itself was never intended to
actually produce $0.70/Wp modules. Complete suc-
cess by the Project still would be only an enabling
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event toward private industry's implementation of the
technology. Although the technology may be capable
of producing $0.70/Wp modules, the actual market
price charged by manufacturers for their product
would be determined by market supply and demand
conditions. Complete success by the Project in no
way guaranteed that the private sector would imple-
ment the technology on a large scale.
The goal should be structured as a single "bottom-
line" from which technical and economic sub-goals can
be derived. Early in the Project, the goals were stated as
$0.50/Wp and 10% efficient modules. Efficiency entered
into the original Cherry Hill Conference estimates of what
would be the necessary efficiency of polycrystalline sili-
con cell modules to achieve $0.50/Wp. Efficiency is sub-
sumed in any $/Wp calculation and at the outset should
have been left as a free variable, as was $/m2 costs.
This would permit maximum flexibility in how the
$0.50/Wp goal was to be achieved.
The $0.50/Wp goal, along with the later $0.70IWp
goal, were themselves not especially good "bottom-
line" goals. They did suffice, however, until 1983 when
an appropriate goal stated in dollars/kilowatt-hour could
be structured. By then, sufficient knowledge and agree-
ment had been acquired regarding system parameters
involved in the actual building and operation of large-
scale PV electrical generating plants. This information
permitted a reasonably well-stated dollars/kilowatt-hour
goal to be made.
Credibility suffers when the audience has difficulty
dealing with the complexities of a sophisticated analy-
sis. During the FSA Project, PA&I developed several
innovative and highly sophisticated models that were
at the leading edge of their discipline. These models
proved highly useful in the internal Project decision-
making process. The same sophistication that made the
models so useful, however, became a severe liability
when attempts were made to convince those unfamiliar
with rigorous and complex procedures of the discipline
that the results of the model were valid.
The contrast between user-acceptance of the
SAMIS computer model and the IPEG cost-estimation
algorithm is instructive as an example of this problem.
SAMIS required the use of a mainframe, time-sharing
computer, and several days training for the operator to
gain familiarity with the intricacies of the model's oper-
ation. Input data formulation was detailed and tedious.
The payoff was extraordinary visibility and insight into
the requirements and costs of the processes being
examined. Errors in input values or assumptions also
were readily apparent. The application of SAMIS to PV
module costing, however, met with vigorous and last-
ing skepticism. (This remained true despite an exten-
sive validation process to ensure the validity of the
results under the input assumptions.)
IPEG is a linear algorithm that divides the cost into
five categories and applies standarized coefficients that
are fixed for each cost category. In fact, the IPEG coeffi-
cients are derived from the same methodology used in
the SAMIS computer program. IPEG analysis requires
virtually the same input data, but IPEG results are some-
what more subject to undetected input error than SAMIS.
Still, the IPEG method achieved wide and virtually unques-
tioned acceptance in the industrial community. The
method of multiplying direct costs by fixed coefficients
is simple and widely used in industrial costing. Very
few inquiries ever were received regarding the origin
or validity of IPEG coefficients.
It is clear from the PA&I experience that great cau-
tion should be exercised when expecting the acceptance
of innovative methodologies, especially by users whose
principal interests are not directly associated with the
methodology or its results. Packaging for ease of user
accessibility and acceptance should rank just below
validity in the criteria for any future model develop-
ment. When disseminating a new and sophisticated
methodology, much attention and time must be given
to education of the users and others whose coopera-
tion is needed to apply the methodology.
There can be problems in maintaining a first-class
staff when most products are internally discreet. Because
of the nature of the PA&I role in supporting Project man-
agement decision-making, many important PA&I products
had only very limited circulation and were completely
invisible to the external observer. This has the effect of
limiting the future professional prospects of personnel in
this position when one's resume consists almost entirely
of intangibles. The FSA Project was especially fortunate
in dedication to the Project of some critical members of
the PA&I staff. Th.ere may be no completely satisfactory
solution to this probiem. One possible approach is to
periodically rotate personnel into more highly visible
activities with more tangible products.
An independent assessment group having no stake
in any specific outcome is highly valuable to project
management. At the outset of the FSA Project, PA&I
was created as a Project area on an equal plane with the
other technical areas of the Project. Equally important,
PA&I was not part of the Project Office and could inter-
act as peers with other segments of the Project, not as
representatives of the Project Office. Consequently, PA&I
was highly successful in acting as the "honest broker" of
information among various parties. The importance of
this somewhat subtle point should not be underestimated
as this seemingly minor organizational construct was
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probably the most enabling factor in the success of the
PA&I activity.
B. LEGACIES
At the outset of the FSA Project in 1975, it became
apparent that a very large number of technical options, in
varying degrees of maturity, were available for develop-
ment. One possible approach would have been to fund a
broad spectrum of activities with only qualitative regard
to nontechnical factors such las manufacturing cost. The
FSA Project, however, chose a difficult, uncharted
course. It set quantifiable, non-technical goals for the end
result of a complex, long-range development effort where
each technical option was to be judged on its contribu-
tion to meeting those goals. It was the task of PA&I to
devise and implement the process by which the progress
of the Project could be enhanced and measured.
Through the years of the Project, PA&I studies have
documented the history of technical and economic pro-
gress toward meeting the objectives of the National
Photovoltaics Program. A framework of goals and guide
lines was established. A number of innovative and
sophisticated analytical tools were developed to track
overall progress and place individual research activi-
ties within the framework of the goals and guidelines.
The analyses performed by PA&I provided the quanti-
tative consistency required for informed management
decisions.
Accomplishments of the PA&I activity, discussed
in Sections III, IV, and V of this report, reflect only the
most tangible of PA&I products. Not included is the
aspect that PA&I became a clearing house for reliable
information on a broad spectrum of subjects, respond-
ing frequently to inquiries from Government, industry,
academia, and private parties. A significant proportion
of PA&I resources was consumed by the demands of
information transfer.
Not all the techniques, methodologies, and
procedures of the PA&I activity will be applicable or
appropriate to other technology-development projects.
Indeed, not all technology-development efforts require
a PA&I activity. But an analysis and integration activity
is essential in those cases where a number of competing
development options must coalesce into an integrated
technology, viable under both technical and non-technical
constraints. The legacy of the FSA PA&I activity will be
the example it provided in enabling the orderly manage-
ment of a very complex technology-development project.
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Glossary
BOS balance of system (non-array elements of MYPP Multiyear Program Plan
a PV system) NASA National Aeronautics and Space
CELLOPT Cell Optimization Model Administration
COSMIC Computer Software Management NSF National Science Foundation
Information Center O&M operation and maintenance
Cz Czochralski (classical silicon-crystal OTA Congressional Office of Technologygrowth method) Assessment
DOD U.S. Department of Defense PAG Price AliocaJion Guidelines
DOE U.S. Department of Energy PA&I Project Analysis and Integration Area (of
EFG edge-defined film-fed growth (silicon- FSA)
ribbon growth method) PC personal computer
ERDA Energy Research and Development PIM Project Integration MeetingAdministration
PPG Program Planning Group
EVA ethylene vinyl acetate
PRDA Program Research and Development
FOB free on board Announcement
FSA Flat-Plate Solar Array Project PURPA Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of
FY fiscal year 1978, PL95-617
FZ float-zone (silicon sheet growth method) PV photovoltaic(s)
GNP Gross National Product PVB polyvinyl butyral
IBM-XT International Business Machines, XT RANN Research Applied to National Needs
computer model R&D research and development
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics SAMICS Solar Array Manufacturing Industry
Engineers, Inc. Costing Standards
IPEG Improved Price Estimation Guidelines SAMIS Standard Assembly-Line Manufacturing
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory Industry Simulation
LCP Lifetime Cost and Performance SAMPEG Solar Array Manufacturing Price
LSA Low-Cost Solar Array (Project) Estimation Guidelines
LSSA Low-Cost Silicon Solar Array (Project) SERI Solar Energy Research Institute
MEPSDU module experimental process system SIMRAND SIMulation of Research ANd Development
development unit Projects
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology SNL Sandia National Laboratory
STC standard test conditions
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Dendritic web silicon ribbons are grown to solar-eel!
thickness. Progress is shown by experimental ribbons
grown in 1976 and 1978 and a ribbon grown in a
Westinghouse Electric Corporation pilot plant.
Czochralski silicon cryslals as grown are
sawed into thin circular wafers. (Support for
this effort was completed in 1981.)
The edge-defined film-fed growth silicon ribbons are
grown to solar-eell thickness. A DOEIFSA-sponsored
research ribbon grown in 1976 is shown next to a
nine-sided ribbon grown in a Mobil Solar Energy
Corporation funded configuration.
/
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Typical superstrate module design is shown with the
electrically interconnected solar cells embedded in a
iaminate that is structurally supported by glass.
Materials and processes suitable for mass production
have been developed using this laminated design.
Prototype modules have passed UL 790 Class A
burning brand tests which are more severe than
this spread of flame test.
A 15.2% efficiency prototype module (21 x 36 in.)
was made by Spire Corp. using float-zone silicon
wafers. Recently, similarly efficient modules were
fabricated from Czochralski silicon wafers.
Photovoltaic Applications
1975
u.s. Coast Guard buoy
with photovoltaic-powered
navigational light.
Later...
House in Carlisle, Massachusetts, with a 7.3-kW
photo voltaic rooftop array. Excess photo voltaic-
generated power is sold to the utility. Power is
automatically supplied by the utility as needed.
Photo voltaic-powered corrosion protection
of underground pipes and wells.
A 28-kW array of solar cells for crop irrigation
during summer, and crop drying during winter
(a DOE/University of Nebraska cooperative project).
1
1.2 MW of photo voltaic peaking-power generation
capacity for the Sacramento Municipal Utility District.
(The 8 x 16 ft panels are mounted on a north-south
axis for tracking the sun.)
